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Abstract 
It basically falls into the category of criminal law 
legislation to discuss whether it is feasible to make it a 
crime not to rescue people in danger in the criminal law. 
In terms of the complexity of its concept and connotation, 
this issue should be differentiated in legislation. Since 
the definition of this crime is out of line with the social 
moral basis popular in China, it is difficult to find support 
for it from the standard for social damage in the theories 
on the criminal law and criminal omission, hence leading 
to imperfect penalty effects and a series of difficulties 
in judicial operation. As a result, in the current social 
conditions, the general subject’s inaction cannot be 
criminalized at the moment. 
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It was in March 2001 that over 100 NPC members 
proposed that doing nothing to rescue people in danger 
should be included in the criminal law due to such inaction 
on people from ruin or in danger tends to cause vicious 
social influences, hence triggering wide attention from 
different fields. Along with the deepening of reform and 
opening, the advance of market economy and accelerated 
pace in linking up with the world, a lot of characteristics in 
China’s social transition period are increasingly obvious, 
among which the omission for people in danger reported 
in newspapers frequently exists. A majority of people who 
learn about such news will be outraged and then deny 
such behavior morally. However, moral issues fall into the 
category of non-compulsory inner restriction, so sensitive 
or rational citizens will resort to the law. In their eyes, the 
coercive power brought about by the establishment of such 
a crime will offer expectations more or less. 
Nevertheless, things do not go so smoothly. Such a 
proposal has aroused wide disputes on issuance. Some 
supporters, such as Sun Guohua, argue that such an 
omission’s social damage is increasing, making it difficult 
to stop such phenomenon’s expansion if it is only treated 
by moral condemnation. Obviously, such an opinion 
focuses on social damage. Objectors list many reasons for 
the infeasibility of adding such omission to the criminal 
law from many perspectives, including morality, politics, 
legislation and judicial practice. In reality, it seems that 
such objective opinion takes dominance in this debate. 
(Xie, 2009; Ruan, 2012; Li, 2010; Fan, 2014) Ever since 
Little Yueyue’s Case in 2011, the disputes on whether 
to include not rescuing people in danger are getting 
increasingly fierce. This article intends to analyze this 
issue from the legislation of criminal law. 
1.  THE CRIMINAL LAW LEGISLATION 
It has been long discussed whether to criminalize not 
rescuing people in danger. Since this issue fundamentally 
belongs to value choice and normal design in the 
legislation of criminal law, legislation should serve as the 
mainstream clue throughout the whole analysis process. 
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    The legislation of criminal law, one part of the important 
contents of the legislative activity, has undergone a 
process from unconsciousness to consciousness all over 
the world. During the course, it is a manifestation of social 
civilization advance for legislation to be shifted from a 
tool for tyranny to a regulatory means for controlling the 
whole society in the conscious manner. Up to now, the 
legislation of criminal law refers to an activity conducted 
by the legislative bureau in creating criminal laws and 
regulations in accordance with the actual demands of 
political and economic development. According to “no 
act, no criminal law”, legislation is by nature a social 
institution for the judgment, choice and screening of act 
value. Any existing or unknown crime is defined based 
on their characteristics according to the value judgment 
and choice of the state, society and the ruling class. This 
process, completed by the legislator, will unavoidably 
involve some subjective factors, therefore, the unification 
of objective reality and subjective evaluation is the 
basis for the survival and development of the criminal 
law legislation. Thus, legislation must conform to the 
principle of being practical and realistic as well as the 
subjective conforming to the objective. In its legislation 
of criminal law, every nation is expected to start from its 
reality. After all, law is only an external manifestation for 
production relations, therefore, any legislation away from 
reality is bound to fail. On the whole, the combination of 
theory and practice must be clung to when discussing the 
feasibility of criminalizing not rescuing people in danger. 
2. THE CRIME OF “NOT RESCUING 
PEOPLE IN DANGER” 
2.1  The Special Subject of the Crime of “Not 
Rescuing People in Danger”
The criminalization of not rescuing people in danger has 
triggered lots of disputes due to the complexity of its 
concept and connotation. Actually, such disagreement is 
caused by unclear idea of such action. Based on whether 
the subject has any specific obligation or responsibility, 
the subject of such omission can be divided into the 
general subject and the special subject. The former refers 
to the subject without specific responsibility or obligation 
while the latter goes to the other end. Here, the specific 
obligation or responsibility can be called duty of action. 
Once endowed with this duty, any inaction forms a 
prerequisite for pure criminal omission due to its damage 
to the interests of law (Li, 2014). According to the 
social contract theory, the rights and obligations among 
naturally-formed social subjects as well as between 
individuals and the nation exist objectively. Since there 
are no accidents, anything reasonable should be protected 
by law. It is the law that endows some people with specific 
obligations to maintain the balance and harmony of rights 
and obligations in the whole society, so the criminal law 
and other laws seem necessary to be in existence. If the 
subject expected to conduct its duty fails to fulfill that, 
such balance between rights and obligations is ruined, 
hence spreading from individuals, local fields to the whole 
society and damaging the interests protected by the law. 
As a result, the criminal law, the last protective barrier, 
lists it as a crime and penalizes the subject accordingly, 
thus maintaining the survival and development of the 
whole society. The inner connection between criminal 
omission and the criminal law legislation and regulation 
serves as the key for the recognition and analysis of the 
criminalization of not rescuing people in danger. 
Generally, if rescuing people in danger is included in 
obligations, it is possible to criminalize not doing that. 
The duty of act related to criminal omission (Zhang, 
2014) generally involves four aspects all of which seem 
to include the obligation of rescuing people in danger 
(Gao, 2014; Zhang, 2011): (a) the duty of act laid down in 
law; (b) the duty of act required by duty or business; (c) 
the duty of act triggered by legal acts which refer to the 
acts able to cause rights or obligations in law and mainly 
refer to contract acts at present; (d) the duty caused by 
antecedent actions. Due to the previous act conducted by 
the doer, certain legal rights are in danger, therefore the 
doer has to burden the duty to take active actions in order 
to prevent harmful results. 
In judicial practice, there are lots of inaction cases 
when endowed with the duty of act in which much 
contradiction is caused due to the complexity between 
inaction and the result. For instance, if a babysitter finds 
the baby cut his wrist which leads to unstoppable bleeding 
but ignores the possibility of life risk and finally leads 
to the baby’s death due to excessive bleeding, there is 
no doubt that this action is a crime. Then how to secure 
the conviction? Criminal homicide? Dereliction of duty? 
Neglect of duty? In my opinion, none of them make 
sense. Therefore, some scholars, starting from the point 
of scientific conviction, propose that not rescuing the 
special subject in danger should be convicted as the crime 
of not rescuing people in danger (Ye, 2013). Although 
this conception sounds reasonable, another issue draws 
attention that in what way the scale of specific duties 
and obligations can be defined. In my personal opinion, 
the scale needs to be defined according to law, duty, 
business, legal actions and antecedent actions. It is not 
an absolute issue whether the special subject should 
assume the obligation of rescuing people in danger. 
Instead, the identity and duty of the subject should be 
taken into consideration for analysis, otherwise the scope 
of attack might be enlarged. For example, the legal duty 
for a policeman is to drive out the rascals and protect 
the people and to protect people’s legal interests from 
being damaged. When he comes across a drowning kid, 
he has no obligation of rescuing due to the limited duty. 
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If he comes to the rescue, his brave act for a just cause 
should be spoken highly of; if he doesn’t do that, what he 
receives can only be moral or disciplinary negation instead 
of legal or even criminal penalty. Obviously, the crime of 
not rescuing people in danger aimed at the special subject 
is reasonable in terms of scientific conviction while the 
specific duties and obligations it involves is of relativity in 
terms of the rescuing act. 
2.2  Considerations on the Feasibility of the 
Criminal Law Legislation and the General 
Subject’s Crime of Not Rescuing People in 
Danger
As is  ment ioned above,  some scholars  support 
criminalizing not rescuing people in danger based on 
scientific conviction and conduct the legislative design 
(Chen, 2012). Despite their point of departure, their 
inclusion of all general subjects into criminal penalty 
remains to be discussed. Expanding such a crime to the 
general subject, no matter whether the doer has the ability 
to rescue the person in danger or whether there is actual 
danger or not, seems unrealistic or even overcorrect. 
Considering there is no sufficient supporting evidence for 
the criminalization of not conducting brave acts to rescue 
people, we only cover whether to criminalize not rescuing 
people in danger conducted by the general subject except 
for that. For this issue, I give a negative answer. 
2.2.1  Consideration of the Social Moral Basis
Law and morality are inseparable. Law is the minimal 
form of morality, in which “minimal” means that it is 
widely accepted by the society. Generally, the criminal 
law achieves its function through prohibitive regulations, 
such as prohibiting murdering and drug dealing by listing 
them as crimes. This legislation is based on the negative 
judgment of the majority of the public towards murdering 
and drug dealing, therefore corresponding criminal 
legislation can achieve public recognition (Zhou, 2013). 
Only such legislation can hold water, can have basis for 
moral reality, consistency and applicability and therefore 
can be followed in practice. In contrast, once not rescuing 
people in danger by the general subject is confirmed 
guilty, such subject is required by the criminal law to 
fulfill the duty of rescuing. Although people usually speak 
highly of people’s bravery in rescuing others in danger and 
show their disapproval of those who don’t, these are only 
direct, external and sensitive responses. Actually, whether 
some moral requirements can be internalized depends 
not on this but on the inner recognition and acceptance 
of the subject. In reality, from the angle of others, people 
seem to be able to understand their inaction when faced 
with someone in danger and this will not necessarily give 
them huge impacts on their moral value system since they 
cannot be sure they will be brave to rescue the person in 
danger if that happens to them. This is the reason why 
sometimes when faced with someone in danger there is a 
crowd who stands by but do not offer a hand. As a result, 
such a legislation criminalizing this act will not be widely 
accepted by the public. To be objective, the current moral 
state of Chinese citizens is still far from being brave to 
rescue people in danger as an instinctive moral response 
of a civilized citizen. 
Many foreign countries such as Germany, France, 
Italy, England and US have all criminalized such inaction 
(Feng, 2000; Wang, 2013). So someone makes such 
exclamation that European and American countries which 
attach greater importance to the division between morality 
and law as well as guaranteeing individual rights and 
freedom even go further than Confucianism-influenced 
China in listing moral requirements into law (Fan, 1997). 
In fact, this is easy to follow. In terms of moral tradition, 
there are differences in characteristics covered by false 
appearance between China and West: China, pursuing 
social orientation, actually emphasizes personal virtues 
while West, pursuing individual orientation, emphasizes 
public morality. China’s thousands of years of culture 
and history are largely built on family system, of which 
self-sufficiency and isolation lead to their people’s moral 
characteristics of being narrow-minded. According to the 
idea of self-cultivation and personal virtue cultivation in 
Confucianism, public morality seems to be lacking in the 
history of Chinese morality development. For instance, 
Chinese people can risk themselves for family members, 
relatives and friends but show indifference to strangers in 
danger. In contrast, in foreign countries, personal freedom 
and rights are emphasized a lot along with advocacy of 
humanism, universal fraternity and equality, sometimes 
encouraged by commodity economy, citizen society and 
religions. Somehow, their universal emphasis on public 
morality is beyond doubt, leading to a huge disparity in 
this issue between East and West. Since rescuing people 
in danger is a kind of mutual assistance among social 
members, it should fall into the issue of public morality. 
Due to their solid moral basis and encouragement of 
social morality, it is not strange that the crime of not 
rescuing people in danger is included in the western 
countries’ criminal law. However in China, due to the lack 
of substantial, universal and strong moral support, this act 
cannot be laid down in the criminal law. 
2.2.2  Reflections on the Standard of Social Damage
The reason for NPC members and a small number of 
supporters for the criminalization of “not rescuing people 
in danger” lies in its social damage. In their opinion, the 
social damage caused by not rescuing people from ruin 
or in danger is serious enough to be convicted by the 
criminal law, which conforms to the consistent position 
and standard for China’s legislation of criminal law. No 
matter it is a crime already defined or not yet, its social 
damage exists objectively, forming the unification of 
objective facts and subjective evaluation. As a result, 
such inaction can be evaluated from the perspective of 
social damage no matter whether it is criminalized. But 
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the problem lies in that social damage is not a reasonable 
standard for the judgment that whether an action should 
be listed in the criminal law. Currently, the theory 
of social damage is increasingly challenged in both 
theory and practice due to it is unavoidable defects: (a) 
ambiguity. It is hard to define a clear and quantitative 
standard when judging an act’s social damage since it is 
a vague and general concept. This ambiguity stems from 
the uncertainty of wickedness in quality and quantity 
defined by the carrier on which evaluation relies such as 
the mainstream value system of the whole society and 
morality. Even from the perspective of tolerance by the 
society, whether such social damage has destroyed the 
basic requirements for the survival of social relations or 
the corresponding adjustment ability of general social 
regulations, its randomness and uncertainty is hard for us 
to follow. (b) It violates the principle of legality, serving 
as a theoretical tool for enlarging the scope of criminal 
attacks, exceeding current laws and regulations and 
carrying out short-term criminal policies. As is mentioned 
above, since we cannot set definite and clear standards 
for the judgment of social damage and social damage 
is generally set on the position of invisible regulations 
which mean that once an act is thought by the force of 
state to have risk or damage and needs to be attacked, 
such a supreme norm of social damage can be employed 
even if the current law has no clear item about it as a 
crime. Such a measure goes beyond current law to achieve 
its purpose of conducting short-term criminal purposes 
by neglecting the principle of legality. Some abnormal 
phenomena during the crackdown are a vivid portrayal of 
its negative impact. (c) It tends to cause penalty beyond 
penal law and unjust judicial practice. Due to the lack of 
definite standards for social damage, the judge has huge 
discretionary power, which acts as the source for penalty 
beyond penal law and unjust judicial practice. To sum up, 
some issues, such as whether there is inaction on people 
in danger, how serious the social damage is, whether it 
is serious enough to be criminalized in the criminal law, 
seem subtle due to the unreasonableness of the standard 
for social damage. 
2.2.3  Considerations on the Composition of Criminal 
Omission 
There are three elements of criminal omission: duty of 
act, failing to fulfill the duty despite ability to do that, 
cause-and-effect relations between the failure to fulfill the 
duty and the harmful result. Considering the latter two 
are not the key of the argument, we only focus on the first 
element here. 
It is easy to induce from the classification of the duty 
of act that these duties have been listed previously in 
some laws, regulations, institutions or matters prior to the 
adjustment of the criminal law. For example, Article 261 
in China’s current criminal law mentions maintenance 
obligation which was previously laid down in the 
Marriage and Family Law and the duty of act mentioned 
in Article 168, 135, 376 and 411 have been in existence 
in Corporate Law, Labor Safety Laws and Regulations, 
Military Law and Customs Law; the duty of act triggered 
by contracted or antecedent acts are also related to 
existing legal relations. The antecedence of the duty of act 
not only manifests the nature of the criminal law as the 
law for final protection but eliminates the criminalization 
of not rescuing people in danger conducted by the general 
subject, that is, the possibility and feasibility of forming 
and forcefully promoting the duty through the criminal 
law. Otherwise, such duty, criminal law and penalty can 
be measures beyond penal law.
2.2.4  Analysis on the Basis Theory of Criminal Penalty
Criminal penalty is a severe punishment. It depends on the 
definition of the scope of criminal punishment whether 
to define an act or relevant social phenomenon as a crime 
and whether to regulate it with criminal punishment. If 
the general subject’s failure to rescue people in danger 
is to be included in this scope, it has to be based on the 
criminal penalty theory but actually it isn’t. The power 
of punishment is based on the organic combination 
of social self-discipline and external discipline. 
Criminal punishment is restricted by social justice and 
utilitarianism in which social justice represents certain 
standard for social evaluation only with which the power 
of punishment can be a solid basis and in conformity to 
the psychological state of the society. Only when people 
accept a regulation as fair and are ready to be restricted 
can it exert the real effects. If it can only be maintained 
by habit or suppression, any tranquility and harmony are a 
false illusion; with disorder and dissatisfaction growing in 
a subtle way, the seemingly controlled desire can explode 
at any moment (Durkheim, 1996).   
The criminalization of not rescuing people in danger by 
the general subject is not only unfair but departs from its 
original aim. Utilitarianism, acting as another prerequisite 
for criminal penalty, requires that the application of 
criminal punishment must serve the purpose of preventing 
crimes. However, once such inaction is criminalized, the 
number of criminals will be large enough to manifest it as 
a punishment on individuals by the state or the society due 
to its non-automation and non-orientation. This measure 
serves the demand for social survival and development 
so the conduct of the power of punishment is of self-
disciplinary nature. Meanwhile, penalty depends on 
crimes and crimes are restricted by many objective factors 
instead of being an outcome of subjective imagination, 
so the power of punishment is of external discipline as 
well. The organic combination of the two is the real basis 
for such power. Great pains caused by increasing penalty, 
together with dissatisfaction of the public, will be likely 
to cause ineffective punishment arrangement and hence 
lead to less effective. Besides, unscientific legislation 
may cause concrete undue infringement on citizens’ free 
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rights, hence leading to negative value of punishment. 
Currently in China, with lots of virtues being lost, such 
a crime can at most dispel those bystanders. As a result, 
a vicious cycle may be produced with no preventive 
function of penalty and ruined dignity of law. With just 
criminal penalty being a necessity, it lacks reasonable and 
sufficient evidence to exert criminal punishment on the 
general subject’s not rescuing people in danger. 
2.2.5  Reality
Another significant reason for the infeasibility of such 
a crime for the general subject lies in some practical 
problems: (a) how to offer proof. For the case of not 
rescuing people in danger, witness statement is the 
most persuasive evidence. In a dangerous situation, 
if someone stands out to offer a hand, the rescuer is 
endowed with the right to testify against those bystanders 
or escaping drivers; but if no one comes to the rescue, it 
is extremely difficult to offer proof. (b) how to confirm 
criminal responsibility. Usually due to the lack of action 
and distinguishable external acts in criminal omission 
it is difficult to confirm the body of responsibility. For 
example, in the case of a pregnant woman’s death due 
to nobody’s rescue, it is easy with only one or a few 
persons on the spot while it is hard to confirm the body 
of responsibility when there is a big crowd standing by 
( this situation is not unusual and happens from time to 
time.) Should all bystanders or only some of them to be 
investigated in terms of criminal responsibility? If we 
agree on the latter choice, what is the applicable standard 
to distinguish these people? Is there practical likelihood 
for it to be against the principle of legality and everyone’s 
equal treatment by the criminal law? These questions 
are unavoidable and hard to answer and deal with. (c) 
The criminalization of not rescuing people in danger 
by the general subject will not only blur the boundary 
between law and morality but reverse the order of rights 
and obligations required by legal ideology and spoil the 
inherent balance and harmony of the criminal law system. 
As a result, maybe more people will fear to frighten, 
hence leading to the disappearance of their remained 
consciousness and sense of justice. For the likelihood 
of the shift of such a negative situation through the 
criminalization of not rescuing people in danger, we might 
as well be cautious. 
CONCLUSION
Law has limited power, so does the criminal law. Since 
legality is not almighty, any real legal state keeps it in 
mind to enhance its moral enlightenment on the public. 
Despite the close relations between law and morality, 
we should still be cautious on such a major issue, which 
is required by the most restraint nature of criminal law. 
Required by scientific conviction, it is reasonable to 
add the crime of not rescuing people in danger for the 
special subject. However, it is not a reasonable treatment 
for the general subject, at least at present and for a long 
time in future. Strict law will not necessarily arouse 
people’s moral conscience but might lead to intentional 
or unintentional legal evasion. With rescuing people in 
danger regarded as an excellent virtue, it is a tragedy to 
have to turn to the criminal law for the adjustment.  No 
rescuing people in danger, as a social problem, can be 
treated by social means. 
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